SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR AND SACRIFICE
Lyle Steadman
Department of Anthropology
Human Behavior and Evolution
Society Meeting
Ann Arbor, Michigan
June 6, 1994
In this paper I am going to argue that the defining characteristic of social behavior is sacrifice, or altruism, and that the defining characteristic of sacrifice is that it is aimed at promoting another’s reproduction at the expense of one’s own. I shall then very briefly argue that the aim, or function of ritual is to encourage sacrifice.
Sociobiology is the study of evolution and
adaptation of social behavior. But what
explicitly constitutes social behavior?
Most researchers would argue that social behavior involves interaction
between two or more individuals; indeed, most define it as interaction. But is interaction necessarily social? Interaction would include a predator pursuing
his prey, enemies attempting to kill one another, perhaps even a gatherer
uprooting a plant; indeed perhaps ANY competition. Surly, competition itself is not social. Furthermore, social behavior may not even
imply interaction. One person can help
another who is in a coma, a mother can help a sleeping child, and an anonymous
donor can help “save the whales.” Such
acts are obviously social, but not interactive.
The action in these cases is clearly one way.
Thus, social behavior seems not to imply
interaction. What it does imply is at
least one individual helping another. Cooperation,
which everyone agrees is social, is social because those involved are helping
one another.
But what precisely do we mean by “helping”? The dictionary claims that it promotes another’s
interests or welfare. But what is meant
by these terms in an evolutionary sense?
To promote another’s survival is not good enough, for that can be at the
expense of the individual’s reproduction.
Castrating a cat, for example, will significantly prolong its life, but
at the expense of its reproduction.
Helping, in a fundamental and evolutionary sense must be to promote
another’s reproductive potential.
Promoting another’s reproductive potential, at the expense of the
helper, regularly occurs between close kin.
What I am now going to argue is that such sacrifice always is at one’s
own reproductive expense.
From Robert Trivers we have learned that when one
offspring receives parental resources it will be at the expense of its
siblings, potential or existing. However
looking at this fact from the parent’s point of view, when a mother helps one
offspring, it will be at the expense of her other existing, or potential,
offspring. That is, parental care is a
sacrifice. It is a sacrifice because it
is at the reproductive expense of the parent.
Let me explain.
By increasing the likelihood that a particular
offspring will ultimately reproduce, the mother is helping only half of her
genes replicate. Put another way, when
her offspring reproduces, only a quarter of her genes go forward, instead of
half, if she reproduces. Most of your
genes will be replicated if you, rather than your offspring, reproduce. Obviously, such sacrifice, at the expense of
one’s additional reproduction, has been selected for. Among mammals, birds, and social insects,
such motherly (and sometimes fatherly) sacrifice has increased the number of
their descendants at the expense of their own reproduction. The same is true for sexual reproduction in
general. Reproducing sexually, as
opposed to asexually, is a sacrifice because only half of one’s genes go
forward, instead of all. In addition,
sexual reproduction involves great costs of meiosis, recombination, and mating
(Daly & Wilson, 1983: 60-62). This
sacrifice, obviously a result of selection for sexual reproduction, again is
aimed at benefiting the offspring at the reproductive expense of the parent.
The “K” [care] strategy, as opposed to the “r”
[reproduction] strategy, is another way of speaking about parental
sacrifice. The “K” strategy, which
involves sacrificing more for each offspring, is at the expense of reproduction,
which is the “r” strategy. Indeed,
parental sacrifice is the basic difference between males, distinguished by
their small investment in each gamete, which is aimed at maximizing their
reproduction, and females, distinguished by their larger investment in each
gamete, aimed at helping offspring reproduce. Thus, the female, in contrast to the male,
has been selected to sacrifice for her offspring’s reproduction at the expense
of her own. This sacrifice has been
selected for because it has promoted the female’s success in leaving descendants
at the expense of her own reproduction.
Note that the focus here is on parental behavior as an ancestral
strategy, in contrast to focusing on such behavior as a reproductive
strategy, which is the basic position adopted by most sociobiologists.
Probably most social behavior is cooperative. But cooperation implies two or more individuals
accepting another’s influence. Accepting
another’s influence makes one vulnerable to that individual and his
interests. Making oneself vulnerable to
the influence of another is a sacrifice, a sacrifice of control over one’s own
body, for it allows oneself to be exploited by the other. Such influence is not clearly
determinable—obviously, one may be influenced against one’s own interests. Cooperation does not necessarily benefit both
(or all) of the individuals involved, some may lose. Mating is an example of cooperation, and when
one is attempting to mate one becomes vulnerable at least to one’s potential
mate. In some instances this can be
highly dangerous, as can be seen when a praying mantis or spider is eaten by
its mate, or a male firefly eaten by a predator that mimics the flashing signal
of a nubile female. Clearly, such mating
misfortunes are at the expense of the male’s future reproduction. The point of all this is that cooperation
implies sacrifice.
Thus, if it is true that social behavior is
distinguished by sacrifice, and I am proposing that it is, then the essential
task of sociobiology must be to account for the evolution and adaptation of
sacrifice. For humans, because social
behavior is extremely complex, that task is huge.
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory may account for
the sacrifice that regularly occurs between close kin. But such a theory does not account for the
occurrence of social behavior beyond close kinsmen, which is found in all human
societies. Because social behavior
involves sacrifice, reciprocal altruism, which focuses on selfishness, also
fails to account for such behavior.
The basic social behavior exhibited by mammals is seen
between close kin. Such sacrifice begins
with a mother nursing her offspring, and then extends outward, through her, to
her other offspring. Humans, everywhere
apparently, recognizing that social behavior is based on kinship, have come to
extend such sacrifice to distant kin; and in modern societies, even to
non-kin. They encourage the extension of
such sacrifice explicitly by the use of terms referring to close kin. That is, through the use of kinship terms,
and other activities, they encourage that behavior normally exhibited only
between close kin.
It is of interest that terms for social
relationships and social behavior in many languages are derived from
kinship. I’ll give a few examples. In rural Ireland today the meaning of the
word “friend,” literally means kinsman.
Indeed, Arensberg writes of two individuals who have lived in one small
community for more than fifty years.
These men were not kinsmen, and after fifty years were still called
“strangers,” not friends; they were not helped at mowing. In English, the words “gentle,” “gentleman,”
“generous,” [and] “genial” are all derived from the Latin word gens,
meaning “clan,” “race,” or “kinship.”
The English word “kindly” or “to be kind” comes from “kin,” therefore
meaning to treat a person like a kinsman.
Even the word “king,” seems to be related to kin, implying, I suppose,
how a king should behave towards his subjects.
The basic meaning of “love” does not have to do with
sex, such as “to make love,” but with a willingness, or readiness to sacrifice
for another. Interestingly, the first
meaning of the word “love,” in Webster’s Dictionary, mentions the word
kinship. (i.e., “a feeling of strong personal
attachment induced by sympathetic understanding, or by ties of kinship”). The second meaning of “love” refers to God
acting like a father to His children.
The Greek word philos (such as in philosophy)
means loving, often described as “brotherly love,” as in the name of the city,
Philadelphia. The Greek term philoi,
apparently the root of philos, literally means kinsman.
The term “comrade” comes from the Latin term camera,
implying co-residence in the same bedroom, and hence in the same family. In a study of Eskimos in a Labrador
community, the only individuals who fraternize with non-relatives are
adolescents. These temporary friendships
always terminate when the Eskimo is pulled back by marriage to his
kinsmen. The term for friend, ilanak,
is derived from ilak, relative, and can be best translated “like
relative” ( Shmuel Ben-Dor 1966: 67).
The author points out, “Eskimo social organization is founded on
kinship; and the extension of the realm of kinship, in one way or another, is
the fundamental principle for interacting with the larger social environment”
(1966: 74). The evidence already cited
suggests that this might be the case for humans everywhere. Certainly it is true that many
anthropologists have mentioned being incorporated into the kinship system of
the people they are studying, sometimes pointing out explicitly that there are
no other appropriate terms in the language.
The point here is that humans, perhaps everywhere,
use the kinship model to encourage kinship behavior, sacrifice, between
distant, or non-, kin.
SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR AND RELIGION
Religions
too, both modern and tribal, use this same kinship model to encourage
kinship-like sacrifice between at least distant kin. While religious sacrifice is often explained
as benefiting a supernatural, such benefit cannot be demonstrated. What can be demonstrated by both researcher
and native is a benefit to the other participants. Given the nature of humans to copy behavior
they witness, and the readiness to cooperate with individuals who have been
altruistic toward them in the past, religiously encouraged sacrifice promotes a
willingness to sacrifice for one another beyond the ceremony.
Perhaps all religions use close
kinship terms to further this aim—religious leaders are called “father,” or
“mother,” co-followers called “brother,” or “sister,” and the followers called
by the religious leader, “my children.”
In most tribal societies, the main groups are descent groups, each
identified by the name of their founding ancestor. This common ancestor is usually called
“father” or “mother,” and worshipped.
The living members, as so-called “children” of this ancestor, call each
other “siblings.” We all know the term
“clan brother.”
The important point here, is that
humans, universally apparently, use the kinship, family model to encourage
social behavior.
In addition, most religions, if not
all, encourage the acceptance of taboos.
While some taboos may be best explained by their economic or
reproductive benefits, such as child spacing, most cannot. Indeed, most taboos surely reduce one’s
health and welfare. What they achieve,
however, is a demonstration, a communication of one’s willingness to suffer
(that is, sacrifice) for those, including ancestors, who encourage the
taboos. Given the readiness of humans to
copy the behavior of people around them, the acceptance of such restraint has
the effect of encouraging the willingness to sacrifice for others generally.
Although you may dismiss these facts
as just ramblings of an anthropologist, I think you should be stunned. Being universal, suggests that these traits
must have been around a long time, long enough to be subjected to, and hence a
result of, natural selection. That is,
the use of the kinship model to promote cooperation, sacrifice, between distant
kin, distant co-descendants, must have significantly enhanced the success of
our ancestors to leave descendants. In non-tribal
societies, “modern societies,” often originated by incorporating,
proselytizing, prophet-created religion, the same kinship model is used to
encourage cooperation between non-kin.
Economic exchange is an example of cooperation, for
each side can benefit. Indeed,
the trade isn’t consummated until each side sees itself as benefiting. But because the exchange always depends upon
some trust, each side is vulnerable to the other and can be exploited by
them. Hence, in tribal societies, trade
is usually only between kin, for the non-kin are not trusted.
The encouragement of sacrifice, of
course, is not an end in itself. By
encouraging cooperation between individuals, obviously, it can promote their
ability to compete with outsiders for scarce resources. Hence, through the encouragement of
cooperation between distant co-descendants, through living parents and
grandparents, dead ancestors have promoted their own descendant leaving
success. In addition, the acceptance of
traditions implies sacrifice, for one is accepting the influence of ancestors,
one is responding to their interests, rather than one’s own. To that extent we are part of our ancestors’
strategy to leave descendants. This
strategy of influencing descendants, of course, was a sacrifice of the
ancestors’ own reproduction.
Finally, if it is true that social
behavior is distinguished by sacrifice, then the essential task of sociobiology
is not to account for competition, which is ubiquitous, but for the evolution
and adaptation of sacrifice, traits that favor another’s reproduction at the
cost of one’s own.
The main point I have tried to make
here is that the essence of social behavior is sacrifice and that such
sacrifice has been selected for as kinship behavior. It is a sacrifice because one promotes the
reproduction of another at the expense of one’s own reproduction. The benefit of such sacrifice has been in the
number of descendants. Selection has
favored humans who sacrificed their reproductive potential to benefit not only
their offspring but their grandchildren, and even more distant descendants,
through the transmission of behavior that became traditional. Cooperation between distant co-descendants
can now be seen as a consequence of ancestral (as opposed to a reproductive)
strategy. While cooperation and
sacrifice can be seen between very close co-descendants as either helping their
own genes (by Hamilton’s argument), or as part of an ancestral strategy, cooperation
and sacrifice between distant co-descendants is a result of traditions, created
and passed down from ancestors. If the
net effect of such traditions is to increase the ancestor’s number of
descendants, such traits, and the sacrifice involved in their transmission,
will tend to increase in frequency.
Celibate priests and kamikazee pilots are easily explained by this
focus. They are a result of ancestral
influence—part of their ancestor’s strategy.
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory
implies that genes can promote their frequency through altruism directed toward
close kin. It has nothing to say about
why females may behave differently toward kin than males, why the “K” strategy
of parental sacrifice has been selected for, nor even why sex itself has been
favored. The approach taken here,
emphasizing ancestral (including parental) sacrifice, helps make sense of the
selection for traditions in general, especially religion. In a sense, then, the argument proposed here
uses the arguments of both Trivers, because he implied that parental care was a
sacrifice, and Hamilton, because he saw that altruism could be explained as
kinship behavior.
I shall now argue briefly that
function, or aim of social rituals is the encouragement of the willingness to
sacrifice for others.
SOCIAL
RITUALS
While the term ritual has usually
been associated with traditional religious worship, it has come to be used much
more broadly, even to include such behavior as the courting rituals of birds
and insects. What then do we mean
exactly by ritual, the meaning common to this range of uses? In particular, what must we identify to label
a trait, or a set of traits, a ritual?
First, a ritual must be stereotyped;
that is, a repeated action. Furthermore,
it need not be learned, if we include courting examples of birds and insects.
The term “ritual” usually implies social
interaction, two or more individuals in a stereotyped, or patterned sequence of
behavior. A solitary individual’s
repeated behavior, such as putting his left sock on always before his right,
sometimes called a ritual, is perhaps best described as a habit, and may have
no social consequence. In any case, here
we are interested in social rituals. The
performance of a traditional ritual, even though conducted by one individual
such as a shaman, reveals his acceptance of the influence of others, including
ancestral authority.
Because a social ritual involves two
or more individuals actively adjusting their behavior to one another, it
involves cooperation. A ritual is never
truly competitive; if it were we would not label it a ritual. Thus, participation in a ritual requires and
demonstrates one’s willingness to cooperate.
However, mere cooperation, even if
repeated, is not necessarily a ritual.
If the cooperation has some aim other than cooperation, such as may be
involved in the sequence of plowing, planting, and reaping in agriculture, we
do not label it a ritual. Eating for the
purpose of gaining energy, is not a ritual, but eating together, in a cooperative,
patterned way, may be. Our physiological
interest in food is often used to promote cooperation through rituals, like
praying before a meal.
In a tribal society in Papua New
Guinea, where I lived and did research for two and one-half years, when I would
see and obviously cooperative interaction I would try to determine its
purpose. Only when I could not determine
its aim, or purpose, did I conclude it was a ritual. Only when I decided it did not help grow
crops, or bring down game, or kill an enemy, or cure a disease, did I conclude
it was a ritual. I believe other
anthropologists must do about the same thing.
What I now see, that I didn’t at the time, is that ritual does have an
aim: it is the encouragement of cooperation itself. By cooperating with individuals in a ritual,
when one later encounters them, one is readier to cooperate with them. One anticipates social behavior from
them. The hypothesis I am making, then,
is that rituals are aimed at promoting cooperation between the individuals involved,
including the audience. And that is
their only aim. Thus, rituals provide
the opportunity to individuals to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate
with the others in the ritual, unfettered by any other aim. If the goal of the trait or traits is other
than cooperation, we do not consider it a ritual.
The anticipation of cooperation
between particular individuals is what is meant by a social relationship. By creating this anticipation between the
participants, rituals help to create enduring social relationships.
The particular cooperation required
in a ritual, encourages particular kinds of cooperation. For example, authority-subordinate
relationships may be fostered, such as teacher-student, or employer-employee,
or as at the investiture of Prince Charles as the Prince of Wales, dukes with
various titles demonstrated, communicated to Charles (and the audience) their
acceptance of his authority. When
Solzhenitsyen retuned recently to his mother Russia he was greeted with a
traditional gift of bread and salt, obviously communicating the willingness to
feed and support him. The ritual of
“trick or treating” at Halloween allows homeowners to show their generosity to
anonymous (masked) kids in their neighborhood.
When a ritual is traditional, all the participants, including the
leader, communicate their willingness to accept the influence of their ancestors,
and those who have encouraged the ritual.
The particular behavior encouraged
in a ritual is usually explained either explicitly in cooperative terms or in
religious, supernatural terms, or sometimes simply saying “that’s what we
do.” When the cooperative aim is made
explicit, that it helps the participants get along with one another better,
that outcome can be easily observed and hence checked. The alleged supernatural aim, however, such
as to please God or the dead ancestors, by definition cannot be demonstrated as
having been successful. The reason we so
often label rituals religious is because their stated supernatural goal cannot
be identifiably realized, that it satisfies a dead ancestor, spirit or God,
that the sorcery actually kills or injures as claimed, that the magic
influenced the rainfall. What can
regularly be demonstrated in all rituals, however, religious or otherwise, I am
proposing, is increased cooperation between the participants.
I wanted to speak of sports as
rituals because, interestingly, sports use apparent competition to promote
cooperation, but I don’t have time.
Also, I have prepared some points on what we mean, and how we identify
an aim, purpose function, etc. But these
points will have to wait.
What I have tried to argue in this
paper is that social behavior, including cooperation, is distinguished by
ancestral sacrifice. Such sacrifice is
aimed at promoting the reproduction of another at the expense of one’s
own. Such sacrifice has been selected
for, apparently, as kinship behavior, beginning with the parent and extending
outwards. Through rituals, religious and
otherwise, through the use of a kinship model, through taboos, humans have
extended such sacrifice to distant kin and eventually to non-kin. All of these traits, because they are
traditional, and hence inheritable, have been subject to natural selection.
APPENDIX
The function, goal, aim, purpose of a trait, or phenotype, is crucial to our entire enterprise. But how do we identify the function, goal, etc.?
The aim of a trait cannot be identified by its
future success. Nor can we discover an
aim by the frequency of a particular effect.
For example, buying a lottery ticket is aimed at winning the lottery,
but it almost never succeeds. Aim,
function, goal, etc., I suggest, must be discovered from results in the past
that led to the recurrence of that trait.
That is, the aim or function of a trait, inheritable or not, is to
achieve that effect which in the past has contributed to the replication
of that trait (either through enhanced reproduction—i.e., natural selection—or
through memory, such as the memory of someone winning the lottery with a
ticket). It follows that a new trait
would be aimless until one of its effects would contribute to the replication
of that trait.