TAKING THE MAGIC OUT OF MAGIC AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

TAKING THE MAGIC OUT OF M= AGIC:

A NEW EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO RELI= GION

Lyle Steadman, Craig Palmer & Cassandra Stevens

Departments of Anthropology<= /span>

Arizona State University and University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

Human Behavior and Evolution Society Me= eting

Rutgers University=

New Brunswick= , NJ

June 21, 2002

Abstract

As evolutionary psychology attempts to explain an ever greater number of human behaviors, it faces the challenge of how to incorpo= rate traditional cultural behaviors such as religion into the evolutionary paradigm. This paper uses the example of traditional practices of magic to suggest ways to approach this challenge. At the level of pr= oximate causation, the first suggestion is that hypotheses be restricted to only th= ose variables that are identifiable. This means avoiding the temptation to follow the nonevolutionary soc= ial sciences in the practice of basing explanations on unverifiable guesses abo= ut what beliefs (or “memes” in evolutionary jargon) may or may not inhabit human brains. To illu= strate how this can be done, we contrast the popular hypothesis that magical pract= ices result from beliefs (or memes) that reduce anxiety, with our hypothesis that magic is a form of communication that promotes cooperation and reduces anti= -social behavior. Finally, we suggest= that this effect of increased cooperation can explain why traditional forms of m= agic have probably existed and had significant positive consequences for the reproductive success of participants for 30,000 years, and perhaps much lon= ger.

INTRODUCTION<= o:p>

&nbs= p; The assumption, made by both traditional social scientists and evolutionary psychologists -- that talk implies belief -- has caused the study of magic,= and religion in general, to be implicitly guided by Evans-Pritchard’s question “how does it come about that people capable of logical behav= ior so often act in a non-logical manner?” (1965:94). By avoiding the un-testable assumption that talk implies belief, however, it is possibl= e to view magic, and religion in general, as a form of communication. This transforms Evans-Pritchard= 217;s fundamental question about religion to: “why do people assert, and co= mmunicate acceptance of, statements that cannot be validated by the senses?” We shall argue that the most significant, identifiable effect of such behavior is in its encouragement of cooperation among those involved. Since this effect is identifiable to both participants and researche= rs, there is nothing “non-logical” about engaging in magical rituals. If, for example, inv= olvement in a magical sea-faring ritual produces greater cooperation and willingness= to sacrifice for each other among a crew, there is nothing “non-logical” about engaging in such an activity before putting one’s life in the hands of fellow crew members on a long ocean voyage. If participation in a garden ritual increases the amount of altruism between neighbors, there is nothing “non-logical” about participating in such a ritual if o= ne will be relying on the altruism of neighbors in the event of crop failure.<= /p>

For E.O.Wilson, “reli= gion constitutes the greatest challenge to human sociobiology” (1978:175). According to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, the study of religion, including such speci= fic behaviors as magic, has stagnated (1966) due to, writes Lawson, a “theoretical vacuum” (1989:305). One potential source of new theore= tical approaches to religion is modern evolutionary theory, and numerous evolutionists have suggested explanations of various types of religious behavior (Campbell 1975; 1991; Wilson 1978; Alexander 1979; 1985; 1986; Iro= ns 1991; Lumsden 1989; Boone 1983; Richerson and Boyd 1989; Dawkins, Blackmore 1999; Burkert 1996; McClenon 1994, 2002; Wilson 2002). Although these explanations vary e= normously, all of them have one thing in common: They all follow traditional social scientists in assuming that the people engaged in religious behavior believe the claims they make. This assumption has a critical implication. It removes their explanations from the realm of science because beliefs cannot be identified. To avoid this fat= al flaw, we suggest an alternative approach to the study of religion that restricts explanations to what can actually be identified, the statements themselves, not the beliefs alleged to cause them. After describing these two alterna= tive approaches to religious behavio= r we shall compare their ability to account for the specific religious behavior known as magic.

THE BELIEF MO= DEL OF RELIGION

Religion is usually defined= as something like “belief in supernaturals” (Horton 1960; Hulkrantz 1983; Wells 1921), with supernaturals being things that cannot be perceived= by the senses. While scientists usually do not explain religious behavior by asserting the actual existence= of supernatural beings and forces (see Winkelman 1982 for an exception), they nearly unanimously explain religious behavior by asserting the existence of equally unverifiable beliefs in= these supernatural things. This lea= ds them to try to explain why people hold irrational beliefs that then cause t= hem to engage in illogical behavior. Evans-Pritchard summarizes the main explanations based on this assumption: “Tylor and = Frazer say it is because they reason erroneously; Marrett, Malinowski, and Freud s= ay it is to relieve tensions; Levy-Bruhl, and in a sense Durkheim,say it is because collective representations [of society] direct their thought”(ibid.). All th= ese explanations assume that the most significant effect of religion lies in its expression; religion is said to exp= ress people’s beliefs, values, emotions, needs, confidence; indeed even th= eir social structure. Nadel appea= rs to be essentially alone in realizing the significance of the problem with this assumption (…). Rappapo= rt also hints at the problem, but also decides to ignore it since no alternati= ve is readily apparent to him (…).

&= nbsp; Evolutionists have followed these social scientists in making the same assumption, that religious behavior occurs because people need, or are compelled to express their beliefs (or memes). As = an alternative to the expression m= odel of religion, we propose a communication model of religion.

THE COMMUNICA= TION MODEL OF RELIGION

We suggest that what can be identified, by social scientists as well as participants, that distinguishes something as religious, is not “beliefs,” but talk, specifically, the communicated acceptance of claims about supernatural entities. Defining religion o= n the basis of identifiable talk, instead of unidentifiable beliefs, directs explanations of religion to focus on religious behavior as forms of communication.

Richerson and Boyd note that “religious sentiments are carefully constructed to be difficult to challenge on the basis of empirical experience” (1989:195). In fact, since supernaturals cannot be identified, the accuracy of claims about supernaturals has the distinctive characteristic of being non-verifiable. T= his allows Evans-Pritchard’s question to be rephrased in a manner such th= at the answer may be sought in identifiable behavior and its identifiable consequences. Instead of the = question, “how does it come about that people capable of logical behavior so of= ten act in a non-logical manner?,” the question becomes, “why do pe= ople assert and accept claims that cannot be verified by their senses?” The answer, we suggest, lies in th= e fact that the explicit, stated acceptance of a claim whose truth cannot be demonstrated, communicates a willingness to accept the speaker’s influence non-skeptically; that is, without regard to one’s own sense= s. Why would communicating such a mes= sage be important to humans universally? We suggest that it is because of the tremendous “non-zero sum” benefits that result from cooperative social relationships (Ridl= ey 1996; Wright 1995). Cooperati= ve social relationships depend on the acceptance of influence between individu= als, and the communication inherent in religious behavior should foster cooperat= ive social relationships in a way unparalleled by any other type of communicati= on, if our hypothesis is correct.

&nbs= p; We shall now contrast these two alternative approaches to the study of religio= us behavior by comparing their ability to account for the specific behavior kn= own as magic, because nowhere is the seemingly irrational nature of religious behavior more obvious than in magic. Hence, nowhere is the contrast between the belief model and the communication model clearer.

MAGIC AS A TE= ST CASE

Although the relation betwe= en magic and religion has been the subject of much debate, we suggest that magic can= be considered as a subset of religious behavior because it is distinguished by= the communicated acceptance of a specific type of supernatural claim. Magic is distinguishable by = the claim, and its communicated acceptance, that certain techniques have “supernatural”effects; that is, eff= ects that cannot be verified empirically. What distinguishes this definition from typical definitions is the absence of any reference to beliefs (see Hunter and Whitten 1976; Evans-Pritchard 1937). Indeed= , our definition is nearly identical to the one proposed by Nadel, except that we do not accept his implicit assumption that talk implies belief. Nadel writes, “By the word ‘magic’ we always mean some procedure or manipulation believed = [we say claimed] to bring about effects which, by its physical properties, it is incapable of bringing about” (1977:1). Nadel’s assumption of belief= leads to his further assumption that the practioners of magic are behaving irrationally, and the question then becomes why they continue to hold these irrational beliefs: “inevitably, the believers in magic must be confronted, again and again, with evidence proving the failure of their mag= ic efforts. How, then, does the = belief in magic survive?” asks Nadel (citation?).

&nbs= p; Distinguishing magic without reference to beliefs has profound consequences for attempts to explain magic. Previous explanations of magic have attempted to answer the question: why do people believe that techniques have certain effects when such effects cannot be identified? Our approach, by referring only to what can be identified about magic, leads to the alternat= ive question: what are the effects of communicating acceptance of such claims t= hat can account for why magic has persisted in all known human populations apparently for many thousands of years?

THE BELIEF MO= DEL EXPLANATION OF MAGIC

&nbs= p; The two most widely accepted explanations of why people believe in magic are th= ose attributed to Sir James Frazer and Bronislaw Malinowski, the latter apparen= tly following William James and R. R. Marett (see Evans-Pritchard 1965:39-40, 4= 8). Frazer (1951:12-15) argued that primitive man has a false understanding of cause and effect, hence he attempts to influence var= ious things -- people, objects, weather, and so on -- by one of two “laws”: the Law of Similarity -- “the magician infers tha= t he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it” -- and the = Law of Contact, whereby the magician “infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was onc= e in contact” (Frazer 1951:12). Malinowski challenged Frazer’s argument that magic was based o= n a primitive and spurious “bastard science,” by pointing out that “primitives” have as sound a sense of cause and effect as modern man (see Malinowski 1929; 1931; 1954).&nbs= p; He argued that people resorted to magic only when they were fearful = or anxious and after having done all they could to ensure success through rati= onal means.

&nbs= p; There are fundamental problems with both of these explanations. If Frazer’s “Law of Contact” were actually believed i= n, it would have to be assumed that everything would be affected by every acti= on, for everything on earth is, or has been in contact with the earth: every magical ritual would not only affect everything on earth, but everything equally. And if a “Noot= ka Wizard,” really believed in the “Law of Similarity,” that= a carved wooden fish used to attract real fish was the same, why wouldn’= ;t he simply eat the wooden fish? (see Frazer 1951). The wooden fish should satisfy him= as much as the real thing, and save him the trouble of having to catch it. Obviously, people do not actually = follow the so-called laws of Frazer’s similarity and contact. If they took these laws seriously,= they should never do anything risky or difficult: magic should be used to accomp= lish everything, and of course it isn’t.

&nbs= p; Malinowski’s explanation of magic, and religion in general, as a means to decrease anxie= ty by instilling confidence, is equally unacceptable. First, since it is only = the belief that a magical ritual actually works which would reduce anxiety, Malinowski’s explanation implies that primitive man believes the clai= ms that magical rituals work even though they cannot be shown to work. This, of course, contradicts Malinowski’s own obsrvation that “primitive man is capable of e= xact observation, of sound generalizations and of logical reasoning” (1931:634). Malinowski’s claim that the belief in magic is brought about by extreme anxiety, to the point where the magician’s “organism is disintegrated,” w= hich temporarily interferes with the powers of reason, is contradicted by the si= mple fact that “most magic is not done in an emotional state” (Evans= -Pritchard 1965). Further, instead of decreasing anxiety, many rituals actually increase it (see Radcliffe-Brown 1939). But most importantly, = Malinowski’s explanation cannot account for Frazer’s data: Why do magic practices = seem to fit so easily into Frazer’s laws of contact and similarity? If Malinowski were right, any old = ritual should do. Any explanation of= magic must satisfy this question.

EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS OF BELIEF IN MAGIC

&nbs= p; Despite being generated from a different “paradigm” (Wright 1995:6), evolutionary explanations of magic have made the same basic assumption that= the practice of magic is caused by the belief that it works. This has in turn led to the same f= lawed explanations.

&nbs= p; For example, Burkert, despite not only approaching religion from the evolutiona= ry paradigm, and citing the view “that a scientific explanation must be materialistic” (Segal 2000,p. 270), refers to “the stability of belief and concomitant behavior” (????: 21). The fact that the practices suppos= edly believed in cannot be shown to work leads him to the same assumption of irrationality seen in the non-evolutionary explanations of magic. For example, he attempts to accoun= t for magical practices by assuming belief in the law of contact; specifically, t= hose involving the sacrifice (cutting off) of a body part to achieve a beneficial effect. He asserts that the &= #8220;‘part for the whole’ sacrific= e can be plainly rational in its calculation of loss and gain” (p. 40) and = that “partial mutilation has its analogues in the world of animals” (e.g., “spider legs break off easily . . . to distract the attention = of simple-minded predators, lizards tails . . . easily break off in the grip of the pursuer while the lizard itself escapes, . . .a fox caught with a paw i= n a trap will bite off its paw to escape”). But the question remains: why do h= umans engage in costly magical sacrifices when there is no evidence that sacrific= e of the part benefits the whole? Burkert claims that “the pattern also explodes beyond what is functional and rational” as it “loses contact with reality and turns into ritual . . . which may be called magical . . .” Unable to explain why the practitioners should believe in something for which there i= s no evidence, he simply asserts that they do: “At any rate, the non-obvio= us connection of cause and effect is widely acceptable, and it makes sense to those who practice it.”

&nbs= p; Giovannoli (1999), assuming a similarity between “beliefs” and “memes”, makes a similar argument. He recognizes explicitly that the assumption of the reality of supernatural entities removes even the most advanced scientific studies from the realm of science. He attempts to explain religion, including magic, by “psychogenes”, which he defines as “beliefs with perceived inheritance= value that are replicated between or within generations” (1999: xvi). He also claims that psychogenes are simply beliefs that people find acceptable (1999: xvii), and goes on to say that “psychogenes appear to be a class of memes” (1999: xvii).<= /p>

&nbs= p; Even though he has replaced beliefs = with the new terms “memes” and “psychogenes”, he approac= hes religion and magic the same way that theorists have for over a century. Because he still assumes the power= of beliefs, now called memes, he also simply replicates their explanations. He begins by asking the same question as Evans-Pritchard: “My initial motivation for writing this = book was to determine why rational minds are capable of believing in myth, . . .” (1999: xviii). He continues with the same assumptions that are found in the century-old explanations of religion, a striking lack of intellectual ability among tri= bal peoples: “A key factor in these beliefs is that our ancestors lacked = the capacity to distinguish between real and spirit worlds.” (1999: xxvi)= .

However, like Malinowski, Giovannoli realizes that even early humans must have been able to come up w= ith accurate explanations: “The evolutionary advantage of seeking explanations for why events occur may be that our ancestors were better abl= e to respond to recurring events and not merely treat them as if they were happe= ning for the first time.” (1999:50). So, like Malinowski, he is forced to account for how this rational thought gets interrupted, and religious behavior results: “It appears that an unfortunate aspect of this survival trait is that the left hemisphe= re, in attempting to ascribe meaning to events, often incorrectly links cause a= nd effect, thereby creating a false memory of events and their meanings” (1999:50).

Thus, we simply have a repe= tition of Frazer’s explanation. All that has been added are a few more hypothesized details about the proximate mechanisms involved in the “erroneous reasoning” of people who practice magic. As Donald Sym= ons pointed out, except in parapsychology, a possible explanation for something is not a demonstration that it exists.

&nbs= p; The above examples demonstrate that despite their advanced technologically enha= nced knowledge about the proximate mechanisms of the human brain, and their use = of evolutionary theory to guide their research questions, and their new jargon= of memes and psychogenes, current evolutionary explanations of religion in general, and magic in particular, still collapse on the unverifiable assump= tion that people necessarily believe what they say.

THE COMMUNICA= TION MODEL EXPLANATION OF MAGIC

&nbs= p; When magic is viewed as communication, the reason magical practices appear to fo= llow Frazer’s laws of contact and similarity becomes obvious -- effective communication requires using approp= riate symbols. To be effective as a= means of communication, magical rituals must make clear both the content of the message and the audience. In regard to content, magic can communicate hate, lust, concern for a person’s health, their garden, a military or sailing venture, and so on. Magical rituals communica= ting hate or anger, for example, typically use objects associated with, or are “similar” to objects used in, actual physical violence. Sharp objects, such as spears or s= harp bones, or fire are common (see Hogbin 1964; Elkin 1964). The intended receiver of the communication is typically specified through the use of objects that are ei= ther “similar” to the person or have been in “contact” w= ith the person. Often an object resembling the person, and/or a piece of the person’s clothing, hair,= or fingernails, is used. In other cases, a person’s footprint might be stabbed with a spear (see Elkin 1964). Another method is simp= ly to throw the magical object at the receiver of the message, or leave it near their dwelling. Our communicative approach leads to the prediction that magic, even though it may be done anonymously, is never performed in true privacy, where it could not be dete= cted by the victim or anyone else.

&nbs= p; Although the content of the communicative message differs with different types of ma= gic, all magical acts involve cooperation. Many magical acts communicate concern for another individual’s health or endeavors, a concern that indicates a willingness to provide tang= ible help in the future. During Na= vajo curing ceremonies, for example, the patient feels himself “being succ= ored and loved, for his relatives are spending their substance to get him cured,= and they are rallying around to aid in the ceremonial” (Kluckhohn and Leighton 1962:231). Rituals associated with sea-faring communicate a promise to cooperate in critical situations, an explanation consistent with the greater use of magic in sea-faring activities involving lar= ge crews (see Palmer 1989). Even sorcery can be seen as a substitute for violence, for it communicates to the receiver that they have done something that is serious enough to deserve de= ath or injury, and that such a fate may be forthcoming if the objectionable behavior continues.

&nbs= p; &= nbsp;

MAGIC AND TRA= DITIONS

&nbs= p; “[Malinowski stated that] [m]agic is traditional” (Malinowski, 1979:40). The techniques involved, the claims about the effects of the techniques, and the ceremonies associated with the= m, are passed down virtually unchanged from generation to generation, and, giv= en their ubiquity, apparently have been so transmitted for many thousands of years. Magic, we suggest, is = one type of religious tradition that increased its frequency in succeeding generations through its effect on promoting cooperation and reducing confli= ct.

&nbs= p; Not only does magic involve specific claims encouraging particular types of cooperative behavior, but the communicated acceptance of the supernatural c= laim itself -- that the magical techniques work as claimed -- has significant consequences for cooperation. If, as we have argued, the distinctive feature of a supernatural statement is t= hat it is always an assertion whose truth cannot be verified, and hence cannot = be disproven by empirical evidence, t= he rejection of such an assertion has the effect of rejecting the authority --= the influence -- of the individual who makes the statement and, perhaps to some extent, all those who make the same sort of statement. An individual faced with an assert= ion about something identifiable can cite evidence disputing it. An individual faced with a superna= tural assertion does not have this option. Hence, a rejection of a supernatural claim implies the rejection of = the speaker’s influence and authority.&n= bsp; Such a rejection can have enormous social consequences, especially w= hen the speaker is an influential elder.

CONCLUSION

&nbs= p; At the level of ultimate causation, this approach sees magic, and religion in general, as having promoted the descendant-leaving success of ancestors by increasing the cooperative social relationships among their descendants. Cooperation implies a willingness to accept each other’s influence; a= nd hence, always involves some risk of suffering. Hence, this approach to religion o= ffers an explanation for the many religiously encouraged acts of self-sacrifice t= hat have been so troubling for previous evolutionary explanations of religion (Wilson 1978, 1996). An individual’s acceptance of “supernaturally” justified tab= oo, pain and sacrifice, communicates not only a willingness to accept the guida= nce of the encouragers, but to suffer for them, to endure pain and loss for them. Thus, a demonstra= tion of the willingness to suffer for others should foster social relationships capable of delayed reciprocity. It does this by communicating to those encouraging the suffering that they are worth suffering for, which should influence them to be willing to reciproca= te. Further, to show a willingness to suffer for others not only influences individuals to reciprocate, it also influences them to exhibit such behavior toward others (see Baron and By= rne 1977). Hence, a tradition of celibate priesthood, for example, can be seen as an ancestral strategy to promote reciprocally altruistic relationships among many generations of descendants by encouraging a few descendants to serve as examples of self-r= estraint and sacrifice.

&nbs= p; A final advantage this approach has over previous explanations of magic and religion is that, because it refers only to identifiable phenomena, the definitions and explanations used in this approach can be falsified.

(PARTIAL) BIBLIOGRAPHY

Giovannoli, Joseph

1999 “The Biology of Belief: How our Biology Bia= ses our Beliefs and Perceptions. Rosetta Press, Inc. Rosetta Press.com.

McClenon, James

1994 Won= drous Events: Foundations of Religious Belief. Univers= ity of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia.

2002 Won= drous Healing: Shamanism, Human Evolution, and the Origin of Religion.&nbs= p; Northern Illinois University Press: Dekalb, IL.

Newberg, Andrew, D’Aquili, Eugene, and Vince Rus= e

2001 Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief. Ballantine Books: New York.